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 Article Summary 
 The jaded clich é of  ‘ defensive medical practice ’ : from 
magically convincing to empirically (un)convincing? 
 Dr Paula  Case 
 The central claim of  ‘ defensive medicine ’ , that proposed reforms or threats of new or 
broader avenues of legal liability will cause doctors to practice defensively, exposing 
patients to the unnecessary risk of harm, and consuming scarce resources which could be 
better used elsewhere, has become a clich é and has lost much of its rhetorical force in UK 
jurisprudence. Despite a substantial body of research appearing to validate the existence of 
harmful defensive medicine, arguments based on the risk of defensive practice triggered by 
litigation more broadly have declined in potency, particularly since the Supreme Court ’ s 
judgment in  Robinson v Chief Constable for West Yorkshire . The fi rst half of this paper charts 
and deconstructs the declining infl uence of the defensive practice argument in court 
judgments. In the second half, the author refl ects on the forensic value of existing research 
into defensive medicine and whether it might usefully contribute to the assessment of 
defensive practice argumentation in medical negligence cases. In doing so, the paper 
draws from studies of defensive practice in medicine conducted in the UK to date, and 
observations from interviews with medical practitioners representing lived experience 
of defensive practice. 
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 Dr Paula  Case 
 Introduction 
 ‘ … it is self-evident that there is a public interest in avoiding excessive litigation and in 
keeping to a minimum what one can call, in shorthand, defensive medicine. ’ 1 
 Defensive practice in medicine has been an enduring staple of medical law discourse/scholarship across the globe. 2 As Lord Justice Irwin intimated in  ABC v St George ’ s 
Healthcare NHS Trust it has become  ‘ shorthand ’ for a bundle of arguments pertaining to the 
negative impact of liability. 3 These include suggestions that proposed reforms or incremental 
extensions of liability will cause doctors to practise defensively, exposing patients to the 
unnecessary risk of harm, and consuming scarce resources in the National Health Service 
(NHS) which could be better used elsewhere, all of which has, and should, rouse deep concern. 
 In the UK context, the importance of stemming harmful 4 and costly defensive 
practices in a resource deprived National Health Service (NHS) has perhaps never been 
greater. 5 However in negligence jurisprudence, legal arguments referencing defensive 
practice have become clich é d. The term  ‘ clich é ’ is used here as metaphor, to illuminate the 
process of an argument, once powerful, and having a taken for granted meaning, losing 
its potency from overuse. The work of Anton Zijderveld is helpful in applying the clich é 
metaphor. He used  ‘ clich é ’ to refer to a metalinguistic 6 social phenomenon, found in 
concepts, ideas or rituals which: 
 ‘ seem to carry truth  – an old and an obvious truth  – not because of their 
semantic content but because of their repetitive use. They are usually not 
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 9  Ibid chapter 3. 
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 11  Zijderveld,  supra n 7 at 89. 
 12  [2005] 2 AC 176. 
 13  [2015] UKSC 11. 
 14  [2018] UKSC 50. 
 15  See  M  Kapp ,  ‘ Defensive medicine: no wonder policymakers are confused ’ ( 2016 )  28  International Journal of 
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heuristically convincing (that would require a refl ective pondering of their 
meaning), but they are magically convincing. ’ 7 
 Clich é s in this sense become a shortcut to reasoning, indeed Zijderveld regards their 
most remarkable quality as their  ‘ capacity to bypass refl ection ’ 8  – their original meaning 
becoming superseded by a political functionality. 9 In the case of defensive practice, the 
clich é ’ s function became resisting extensions of liability in certain  ‘ pockets ’ of negligence. 10 
Now, however, the jurisprudential clich é of defensive practice has been dismantled and 
replaced by opposing propositions which also bypass refl ection, namely judicial instinct 
that increased liability only enhances standards. With neither the  ‘ defensive practice 
argument ’ nor the  ‘ standard enhancing argument ’ being explicitly supported by further 
evidence in court, a stalemate has been reached. According to Zijderveld, the power of 
the clich é can be deliberately  ‘ bound ’ or limited, and scrutiny used to restore the essential 
balance between meaning and function. 11 In the fi nal sections of this article, the author 
explores whether existing research into defensive medical practice could usefully restore 
the balance between meaning and function to court decisions on this issue. 
 This paper will fi rst examine the dynamics of defensive practice in medicine, using 
the meaning employed in court judgments as a way into the discussion (Part I). In Part II 
the rise and fall of defensive practice argumentation more generally is traced through 
common law negligence cases, including in the context of high profi le medical negligence 
judgments, such as  Gregg v Scott , 12  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board 13 and  Darnley 
v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust . 14 A panoramic sweep of negligence jurisprudence 
suggests that judicial attitudes have recently shifted. Judicial discourse has switched 
from treating the proposition that extending liability will increase defensive practice as 
 ‘ magically convincing ’ and endorsing it as a legitimate policy consideration in shaping 
liability with little oversight, to the rebuttal of defensive practice arguments on the basis 
that the proposition  ‘ lacks empirical evidence ’ or that imposing additional liabilities tends, 
in fact, to be  ‘ standard enhancing ’ . In Part III, the author examines whether the sum of 
UK studies of defensive practice in medicine substantiates claims that there is no empirical 
evidence of defensive medicine in particular, and that therefore argumentation based on 
defensive practice in medicine has no place in negligence jurisprudence. 
 Although this paper is not the fi rst to comment on existing studies of defensive 
practice, 15 it is the fi rst to either systematically chart the demise of defensive practice 
argumentation or to interrogate connections between these shifts in the case law and 
the fi ndings of defensive practice studies. The analysis that follows attempts to triangulate 
negligence jurisprudence, a substantial body of defensive practice research spanning over 
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four decades and 10 in-depth interviews with medical practitioners (including 3 x General 
Practitioners (GPs), 1 x rheumatologist, 1 x anaesthetist, 1 x obstetrician, 1 x geneticist, 
1 x specialist in infectious medicine and 2 x FY1s). Interviewees were asked if they were 
aware of instances of defensive medicine in their own practice, or that of their colleagues, 
before being asked their views on the causes behind defensive practice. Content analysis 
software, NVivo 12.0 was used for initial exploratory coding, followed by fuller systematic 
re-coding of the interview transcripts. 16 Prominent narratives emerged from coding; namely, 
the enmeshed nature of defensive practice in medicine and the impossibility of unravelling 
its multiple causes and other dimensions of defensiveness which are hidden by quantitative 
studies, but which go to the heart of the doctor – patient relationship. These narratives 
were extremely valuable, both in exposing problems with the use of  ‘ shorthand ’ references 
to defensive practice in medicine, and in highlighting intractable problems of causation 
which can limit the usefulness of research in evidencing defensive practice claims. 17 
 I. The narrow judicial account of defensive practice 
in medicine: questionable assumptions 
 As this paper starts by positioning defensive medicine in the jurisprudence, judicial 
defi nitions are used as a way into the analysis. Such defi nitions are rare, but in 1985 
Lord Scarman in  Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital referred to 
defensive practice as  ‘ the practice of doctors advising and undertaking the treatment which 
they think is legally safe even though they may believe that it is it not the best for their 
patient ’ . 18 This defi nition is almost identical in scope to Lord Justice Lawton ’ s earlier 
reference in  Whitehouse v Jordan to defensive medicine as: 
 ‘ adopting procedures which are not for the benefi t of the patient, but safeguards 
against the possibility of the patient making a claim for negligence. ’ 19 
 Both defi nitions rely explicitly or implicitly on four common assumptions, which together 
make up a fairly narrow account of defensive practice in medicine. These assumptions, 
explored further below, are that: 
 (i)  defensive medicine is a corruption of the doctor ’ s duties; 
 (ii)  defensive medical practices are bad for patients; 
 (iii)  defensive practice in medicine manifests as an unnecessary  ‘ intervention ’ ; and 
 (iv)  that negligence litigation can be isolated as a unique trigger for defensive medicine. 
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 (i)  A corruption of the doctor ’ s duties 
 The normative content of defensive medicine discourse tends to blame doctors for their 
preference of self-interest (in Lord Scarman ’ s words, being  ‘ legally safe ’ ) ahead of the 
patient ’ s interests. This prioritisation of the doctor ’ s interests involves a distortion of the 
doctor ’ s purpose, a corruption of their duty of benefi cence. 20 Such framing may generate 
concerns that go to the integrity of the profession 21 or to the confi dence that patients can 
have in their doctors. 22 Arguably this  ‘ corruptive ’ framing is objectionable as it obscures 
the real issue of whether the medico-legal defensiveness is good for patients, and also 
because it speaks to a time when doctors were unhelpfully and unrealistically regarded as 
paragons of virtue who could reliably be expected to shelve all self-interest. 23 
 (ii) Defensive practice is  ‘ unnecessary ’ and potentially 
harmful medicine 
 In addition to corruptive framings, defensive practice in medicine is assumed to necessarily 
lead to bad outcomes for patients. Lord Scarman ’ s reference to  ‘ unnecessary ’ treatment 
implies  ‘ harms ’ , whether in exposing the patient to unnecessary risks and side effects or 
losses to the net health of the population, as resources have been misallocated. 24 As will be 
outlined later, however, it is far from clear that defensiveness per se is necessarily bad for 
patients, and it is incredibly diffi cult to reliably ascertain when defensiveness in medical 
practice becomes harmful to patient ’ s interests. 25 
 (iii) Defensiveness is expressed through  ‘ intervention ’ 
 Any assumption that defensive practice in medicine is necessarily expressed through 
 intervention is problematic, as intervention implies the application of treatment or 
prescription of a drug and underplays the insidious, protean forms of defensive practice 
in medicine. In contrast, most researchers regard defensive practice in medicine as 
encompassing both defensive  acts , including referral, diagnosis and treatment and defensive 
 omissions to treat. The vocabulary of defensive practice research is now shaped by Bourne 
et al ’ s study 26 which popularised the terms  ‘ hedging ’ for interventions and  ‘ avoidance ’ for 
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defensive non-intervention, a stepping away from certain procedures or patients because 
they represent a higher risk of complaint. 27 The 10 interviewees in the present study 
readily reported awareness of defensive conduct (by themselves and by others) as including; 
ordering CT scans, X-rays or ultrasound scans for ever lower thresholds of symptoms, 
ordering  ‘ full bloods ’ , keeping patients in hospital unnecessarily, defensive prescribing 
(eg of antibiotics 28 ), but also practices which might not be termed  ‘ interventions ’ but 
which certainly consumed resource, for example, adding superfl uous notes to a patient ’ s 
records, spending longer over explanations to patients, additional referrals, excessive use of 
chaperones and additional follow ups with patients. Consistently with other studies, all 10 
interviewees were less likely to identify with examples of avoidance,  ‘ if you work in the 
NHS it ’ s hard to avoid a patient! (laughs) ’ , 29 but all volunteered examples, nevertheless. A few 
identifi ed with avoidance as a factor in surgery (a kind of  ‘ audit ’ defensiveness, exhibited 
by surgeons wanting to protect their mortality statistics 30 ) and others cited examples of 
avoiding  ‘ medico legally hazardous jobs ’ , such as  ‘ out of hours ’ GP work, avoiding intimate 
examinations or avoiding particular patients who had a reputation for being litigious. 
Occasionally, the implications were particularly serious: surgery cancellations due to 
 ‘ avoidance ’ of the high-risk patient would usually only mean that the patient had to wait a 
little while longer as the procedure would be re-listed and often with another surgeon, but 
in cases of emergency, avoidance by a surgeon reluctant to take on a perceived  ‘ high-risk ’ 
patient could cause delay and the patient ’ s condition worsened as a result: 
 ‘ I sometimes pick up the pieces the next day of this patient who is that little bit more 
septic or that little bit more confused because they ’ ve become iller overnight. And that 
sucks, that sucks for the patient. And we all feel bad. ’ 31 
 Interviewees confi rmed fi ndings of earlier research, in that it is the former type of defensive 
medicine (interventionist) which is far more prevalent. 32 Avoidance, although considered 
rare, could result in patients being  ‘ passed from pillar to pos t ’ with no-one really taking 
responsibility for their care 33 and should therefore not be ignored. 
 (iv) The trigger for defensive practice is negligence litigation 
 The fourth assumption, namely that defensive medicine is a response to the threat of 
negligence liability, involves a highly selective, reductionist account of defensive practice. 34 
 Sidaway belongs to an era when professional regulators stood accused of complacency and 
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inaction, and the negligence claim probably did constitute the main avenue of complaint 
for substandard medical care. 35 Research into defensive practice in medicine has, however, 
re-contextualised such defensiveness as a multifactorial phenomenon with broader 
parameters. Summerton, for example, defi ned defensive practice in medicine as  ‘ ordering 
treatment, tests and procedures  “ for the purpose of protecting the doctor from criticism ” 
rather than diagnosing or treating the patient ’ , 36 identifying the trigger as the threat of 
 ‘ criticism ’ , rather than medico-legal repercussions exclusively. Similarly, Chamberlain 
characterises defensive medicine as a means of  ‘ protection against possible accusations of 
negligence or under performance ’ . 37 This re-contextualised version of defensive practice 
in medicine adopted by researchers disrupts potential alignment with defensive practice 
argumentation in the courts, where the assumption is that negligence liability can be 
isolated as a trigger for harmful defensive practices. As we will see, this divergence may 
impact on the ability of lawyers to claim that there is convincing empirical evidence of 
defensive practice in medicine for the purposes of infl uencing the shape of negligence 
liability. 
 II. Doctrinal engagement and the demise of defensive practice 
argumentation in negligence: from magically convincing to 
empirically unconvincing ? 
 Judicial defi nitions of defensive practice in medicine provide only a  ‘ snapshot ’ or 
 ‘ shorthand ’ for this nuanced and complex phenomenon as researchers tend to understand 
it. The narrow jurisprudential account blames doctors for harmful defensive practices, 
focuses on  ‘ interventions ’ , assumes that we can easily identify when defensiveness becomes 
undesirable, and that we can isolate negligence litigation as a cause of harmful defensive 
practice. It does not seamlessly correspond with the re-contextualised discourse of 
defensive practice in research which encompasses both  ‘ hedging ’ and  ‘ avoidance, rarely 
interrogates the line between harmful and benefi cial defensiveness and which recognises 
multiple causes of defensive behaviour. Meanwhile, the language of defensive practice 
was also being re-contextualised in court judgments, albeit in a different direction. 
The following section examines court judgments to chart the re-contextualisation and 
demise of explicit defensive practice arguments in negligence doctrine. 
 Re-contextualisation of defensive practice arguments in negligence 
 With its jurisprudential roots in the 1980s cases of  Whitehouse v Jordan and  Sidaway 
referred to above (both concerned with the standard of care in medical negligence) , the 
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language of defensive practice came to be used in arguments of more general application 
to professions beyond medicine and also public bodies, usually tied to the concept of duty 
of care. A search of Westlaw UK for  ‘ defensive medicine ’ ,  ‘ defensive practice ’ ,  ‘ defensive 
policing ’ and  ‘ detrimentally defensive state of mind ’ 38 reveals that there are at least 49 
reported cases where defensive practice arguments are expressly 39 referenced. 40 Within 
these judgments, the defensive practice argument is most readily associated with a series 
of cases concerning police liability, starting with Lord Keith ’ s judgment in  Hill v Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire. 41 However, it is in the earlier case of  Rowling v Takaro Properties 
that we see Lord Keith experimenting with arguments of what he then termed  ‘ overkill ’ : 
 ‘ It is to be hoped that, as a general rule, imposition of liability in negligence 
will lead to a higher standard of care in the performance of the relevant type of 
act; but sometimes not only may this not be so, but the imposition of liability 
may even lead to harmful consequences. In other words, the cure may be worse 
than the disease. ’ 42 
 The medical analogy herein hints at a transposing of the defensive medicine argument 
from  Whitehouse and  Sidaway into a more general policy concern. Less than a year after 
 Rowling , Lord Keith developed this argument against imposing a duty of care into what 
became known as  ‘ the  Hill principle ’ , namely that:  ‘ the imposition of liability on the police 
for failures to protect members of the public from third party criminals  ‘ may lead to the 
exercise of a function being carried on in a detrimentally defensive frame of mind. ’ 43 That 
Lord Keith ’ s reasoning here represented a transposition of defensive medicine concerns 
into a policy argument of more general application is again signalled by Lord Justice 
Staughton in  M v Newham LBC where he said of the  Hill principle: 
 ‘ Certainly that danger is very important in medical negligence cases: high 
standards of duty and vast awards of damages result in unnecessary tests and 
other procedures at great expense, as experience in the United States has 
shown. ’ 44 
 The clich é of defensive practice, now  ‘ unbound ’ from medicine, featured in a number 
of prominent late twentieth century judgments endorsing suggestions that public bodies 
ought to be protected from certain claim types because of the social cost of defensive 
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 56  H  Teff ,  ‘ Standard of Care in Medical Negligence  – Moving on from  Bolam ? ’ ( 1998 )  18  OJLS  473 at 474. 
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practices that increased litigation would bring. 45 Wider dispersal of the defensive practice 
argument was not accompanied by attempts at further defi nition, indeed it had no precise 
meaning, and as is often the case with clich é s, it became  ‘ autonomous ’ , attracting a new 
meaning and  ‘ momentum of its own ’ . 46 Appeals to the need to avoid incentivising 
harmful defensive practices were most commonly associated with  ‘ policy ’ 47 reasons for not 
imposing a  ‘ duty of care ’ in negligence cases, particularly when considering  ‘ novel ’ cases 
and assessing under  Caparo principles whether it was  ‘ fair, just and reasonable ’ to impose 
such a duty. 48 However, infi ltration of these policy concerns was not confi ned to the  ‘ duty ’ 
question, and could manifest when considering whether the defendant should be regarded 
as in  ‘ breach ’ of that duty, 49 when addressing the appropriate test of causation 50 and when 
deciding whether to impose vicarious liability. 51 
 Whilst re-contextualised defensive practice argumentation tended to congregate 
around duties of care, the axiomatic status of the duty of care owed by health care professionals 
to their  ‘ patients ’ 52 generally ruled out a fi nding of  ‘ no duty ’ . 53 In the medical sphere, 
defensive practice arguments remained more readily associated with  ‘ breach ’ in negligence 
cases. Lord Diplock in  Sidaway , for example, had appeared to support an application of the 
 Bolam test 54 to determine breach of duty in matters of a doctors ’ non-disclosure of risks 
to patients. According to this test, a doctor is not negligent if his conduct is accepted as 
proper by  ‘ a responsible body of medical opinion ’ , 55 a standard which relies heavily on 
peer support from the profession and the application of which came to be regarded as a 
defence of  ‘ accepted medical practice ’ . 56 Reference to the  Bolam standard in the context 
of questions of disclosure in  Sidaway was proposed on the grounds that a stricter test could 
cause doctors to avoid modern treatments and would encourage  ‘ defensive medicine with 
a vengeance ’ . 57 Use of the  Bolam test in relation to disclosure was also expressly justifi ed 
by the need to minimise defensive medicine in  Gold v Haringey Health Authority. 58 
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 Demise of defensive practice argumentation: no longer magically convincing ? 
 The fusion of defensive practice concerns with the use of  Bolam was unfortunate. Excessive 
judicial deference to the medical profession through over-application of the  Bolam test 
was staunchly criticised. 59 The effects of this protective device offered a  ‘ preferential 
position ’ to medical professionals, viewed by some as showing that medicine was  ‘ above 
the law ’ and had been  ‘ left to its own devices ’ by the courts. 60 The territorial creep of 
 Bolam into issues of disclosure in  Sidaway was later  ‘ marginalised ’ 61 before fi nally being 
overruled in  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board in 2015. 62 Now the courts, not the 
profession, were the arbiters of when non-disclosure was negligent, and the  Montgomery 
judgment gave short shrift to arguments based on the risk of defensive practice. 63 The 
strong association between judicial defensive practice narratives and old policies of 
excessive/undue judicial deference to doctors may provide further clues as to defensive 
practice ’ s demise. 
 In fact, a survey of negligence judgments over the last fi ve years 64 reveals a vivid 
pattern of endorsement of defensive practice arguments at High Court or Court of Appeal 
level, 65 followed by  ‘ ousting ’ of the same argument if the case was appealed to the Supreme 
Court. Particularly signifi cant in this regard was Lord Reed ’ s judgment in  Robinson v Chief 
Constable West Yorkshire , a pivotal moment in determining the role of policy in shaping 
negligence liability. The Court of Appeal had denied the police owed a duty of care 66 
to a bystander injured in a scuffl e which occurred during the arrest of a suspected drug 
dealer. The basis of the ruling was an application of the defensive practice and policy 
reasons articulated in  Hill v Chief Constable for West Yorkshire in respect of omissions, 67 
but extended here to encompass positive acts by the police when in the course of their 
policing functions. The majority of the Supreme Court however, inverted the Court of 
Appeal ’ s position to fi nd that public authorities generally owed duties of care in the same 
way as ordinary citizens, labelling this  ‘ a return to orthodoxy ’ , 68 and thereby suppressing 
the  ‘ defensive policing ’ lines of argument. Lord Reed, giving the lead judgment, found 
that recourse to policy considerations to justify a rejection of liability on the grounds of 
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of Police for the Metropolis [ 2018 ]  UKSC 40  – no duty of care owed by Police Commissioner to protect her police 
offi cers from economic or reputational damage in proceedings relating to the offi cer ’ s alleged misconduct. 
 70  [2017] EWCA Civ 2185. 
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 72  [2015] EWCA Civ 1139 at [62]. 
 73  [2017] UKSC 60 at [68]. 
 74  [2017] EWCA Civ 151,  per Sales LJ at [88]. 
 75  Ibid . 
 76  [2018] UKSC 50 at [22]. 
 77  [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] UKSC 2 and [2018] UKSC 11 respectively. 
 78  With the exception of  Darnley and  Montgomery , it might be said that these judgments are mainly concerned with 
the liabilities of public authorities for the wrongs committed by third parties and have limited import for medical 
negligence litigation. But the historic ill-advised, over-use of the broad re-contextualised version of defensive 
practice clearly has the potential to taint any hint of defensive practice argumentation. 
assessing whether it was  ‘ fair, just and reasonable ’ to impose a duty of care under  Caparo 
principles was reserved for truly  ‘ novel ’ cases. 69 
 Defensive practice arguments were revisited in the  CN v Poole BC litigation, where 
the issue at stake was constructed as whether local authorities owed a duty of care to 
children who were known by the authority to be at risk of harm from third parties. In 
the Court of Appeal Lord Justice Irwin had cited the risk of practising defensively as one 
of the main reasons against fi nding such a duty:  ‘ liability in negligence will complicate 
decision-making in a diffi cult and sensitive fi eld, and potentially divert the social worker 
or police offi cer into defensive decision-making ’ . 70 This was once again reversed in the 
Supreme Court; Irwin LJ had failed to observe the shift away from  ‘ policy reasoning ’ 
in subsequent cases and the substitution of defensive practice reasoning for limiting the 
liability of public authorities with consideration of whether a duty of care would confl ict 
with the legislative scheme under which the public authority was working. 71 In a similar 
manoeuvre, the Court of Appeal in  NA v Nottinghamshire CC had refused to impose 
vicarious liability on local authorities for the acts of foster carers.  ‘ Particularly infl uential ’ in 
Lord Justice Burnett ’ s thinking was  ‘ the fear that it would also lead to defensive practice in 
relation to the placement of children, ’ 72 an argument later rejected by the Supreme Court 
as  ‘ diffi cult to accept. ’ 73 
 In a fourth iteration of this sequence, the Court of Appeal in  Darnley v Croydon 
Health Services NHS Trust found that NHS trusts owed no duty to provide accurate 
information about waiting times via their receptionist staff, as the  ‘ [i]mposition of such a 
duty would be likely to lead to defensive practices on the part of NHS trusts to forbid their 
receptionists to provide any information about likely waiting times ’ . 74 The  ‘ social cost ’ of 
withdrawing information from those awaiting treatment outweighed  ‘ considerations of 
justice as between claimant and defendant in this sort of case ’ . 75 Once again, the Supreme 
Court disagreed. The legal issue was reframed  – the proposed duty of care was not  ‘ novel ’ 
but the application of an established duty to new facts, and in any case,  ‘ the undesirable 
consequences of imposing the duty in question ’ had been  ‘ considerably over-stated ’ . 76 
Although not following the same pattern of  ‘ reversal ’ , three additional Supreme Court 
judgments in  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales 
and  Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD 77 (discussed below) can be added to this 
list as further recent examples of the defensive practice argument being discarded. 78 
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 83  [2015] UKSC 2 at [184]. 
 84  [2018] UKSC 4 at 112, agreeing with Lord Brown in  Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police; 
Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [ 2009 ]  AC 225 . 
 The  Robinson judgment and the six other Supreme Court judgments identifi ed above 
( Armes, Montgomery, Michael, DSD, Darnley and  Poole) galvanised the status of defensive 
practice argumentation as being that of a worn out clich é which had lost its rhetorical 
force and had little place in negligence doctrine. 79 Just as  ‘ deference ’ had become a  ‘ dirty 
word ’ 80 in medico-legal scholarship, appeals to the need to limit liability to curtail defensive 
practices have become tainted by association with their uncritical overuse in the context 
of police liability. Rebuttal is now the norm; arguments about defensiveness are clearly no 
longer magically convincing. 
 Judicial rebuttals of the defensive practice argument: the need to be empirically 
convincing ? 
 Within these corroborative rebuttals of the defensive practice argument in the Supreme 
Court (and earlier judgments), there are broadly two forms of rebuttal which are dissected 
below. These are: (i) that there is no convincing evidence of the likelihood of harmful 
defensive practice; and (ii) that imposing additional liabilities tends to in fact be standard 
enhancing rather than detrimental. 
 Rebuttal #1:  ‘ unproven ’ 
 Appellate courts have repeatedly rejected defensive practice arguments connected with 
duty of care on the grounds of a lack of evidence that a particular ruling risked increasing 
defensiveness in practice. In the early 2000s, this fi rst strain of rebuttal was key in dismantling 
advocates ’ immunity from negligence litigation in  Hall v Simons , Lord Steyn claiming that 
the notion that fears about unfounded claims might negatively impact conduct had  ‘ a most 
fl imsy foundation, unsupported by empirical evidence ’ . 81 Shortly before  Robinson , Lord 
Kerr in  Michael v Chief Constable for Police of South Wales had treated the lack of empirical 
evidence as partial grounds for rejecting  ‘ defensive policing ’ reasoning: 82  ‘ A large part 
of that diffi culty stems from the lack of empirical evidence to support any of the feared 
outcomes such as have been adumbrated in [previous cases] ’ . 83 However, not all judges 
agree that claims of defensive consequences require empirical validation. Lord Hughes 
(dissenting) in  Robinson v Chief Constable for South Yorkshire regarded the risk of harmful 
defensive practice as an  ‘ inevitable ’ result of increased avenues of litigation which could 
 ‘ scarcely be doubted ’ . 84 
 Rejection of defensive practice concerns on the grounds that there is  ‘ no evidence ’ , 
at fi rst sight may seem disingenuous, as it implies that an affi rmative court decision on a 
policy issue is contingent upon some empirical evidence ( ‘ empirical ’ being used here to 
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 15  Med L Rev  153 . 
 86  J  Hartshorne et al  ‘ Caparo under Fire: a study into the effects on the fi re service of liability ’ ( 2000 )  63 ( 4 )  Modern 
Law Review  502 at 505. 
 87  [2015] UKSC 2 at [160]. 
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 89  [2001] 2 AC 619. 
mean some form of knowledge based on experience or observation rather than theoretical 
deduction). Yet, controversial judgments in medical law are often made in  ‘ an empirical 
vacuum. ’ 85 Hartshorne et al remarked on the speculative nature of what was known as the 
 Hill policy argument: 
 ‘ not based upon research into the likely effects of the imposition of a duty of 
care; they were not even based upon factual evidence adduced at the hearing. 
Ultimately they were based upon the submissions of counsel and the thoughts 
of the judges, all based on speculation. ’ 86 
 Having rejected defensive practice arguments partly on the grounds of the lack of 
empirical evidence either way, there is some irony in Lord Kerr ’ s later statement in  Michael 
in the specifi c context of assessments of justice, fairness and reasonableness for duty of care 
purposes: 
 ‘ These calculations are not conducted according to fi xed principle. They will 
frequently, if not indeed usually, be made without empirical evidence. For the 
most part, they will be instinctual reactions to any given set of circumstances. ’ 87 
 Lord Kerr ’ s unapologetic realism is admirable for its candour. It clearly, however, raises 
questions about transparency, accountability and certainty if  ‘ instinctual reaction ’ rather 
than evidence is the acknowledged basis of judicial decision making. 88 
 Rebuttal #2: instinctual reaction  – liability is  ‘ standard enhancing ’ 
 The second strand of judicial rebuttal of defensive practice argumentation is clearly based 
on Lord Kerr ’ s  ‘ instinctual reaction ’ . Whilst a number of recent judicial accounts reject 
claims of defensive practice on the basis that empirical evidence is absent, others neutralise 
the defensive practice argument by preferring what may become a competing clich é 
which asserts that extensions of liability will produce  enhanced standards of performance 
(despite the identical absence of supporting evidence). An early example is seen in  Phelps 
v Hillingdon where Lord Slynn, responding to the question of whether educational 
psychologists could owe a duty of care to pupils, stated: 
 ‘ Nor should it inspire some peculiarly defensive attitude in the performance 
of their professional responsibilities. On the contrary it may have the healthy 
effect of securing that high standards are sought and secured. ’ 89 
 More recently, Lady Hale ’ s minority judgment in  Michael was similarly persuaded by the 
positives of potential liability of the police in negligence when they had failed to protect 
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 94  [2015] UKHL 11 at [93]. 
 95  Gregg v Scott [ 2005 ]  UKHL 2 at [55] – [56]. 
individuals from imminent injury:  ‘ It might conceivably  … lead to some much-needed 
improvements in their response to threats of serious domestic abuse ’ . 90 Further, in 
 Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD , Lord Kerr, the same judge who in  Michael 
had rejected defensive practice on the basis of a lack of empirical support, was confi dent in 
asserting that policy reasoning should not constrain the shape of liability for police failures 
to protect members of the public: 
 ‘ On the contrary, it should lead to more effective investigation of crime, the enhancement 
of standards and the saving of resources. There is no reason to suppose that the 
existence of a right  … would do other than act as an incentive to avoid those 
errors and to deter, indeed eliminate the making of such grievous mistakes. ’ 91 
 The landmark judgment from the Supreme Court in  Montgomery v Lanarkshire went further. 
Lord Kerr and Lord Reed ’ s joint speech demonstrated both a  ‘ short shrift ’ approach to the 
defensive practice argument, but also a suggestion that jettisoning the ubiquitous  Bolam 
standard for disclosing risk could improve practice and simultaneously reduce litigation 
for the future. 92 Raising the standard of care would ultimately perhaps be  ‘ less likely to 
encourage recriminations and litigation ’ than the previous approach where patients relied 
on doctors to decide whether an inherent risk of the procedure was material. 93 In short, 
the greater fl ow of information to the patient envisaged would  ‘ responsibilise ’ the patient 
for their own health care decisions and reduce tendencies to blame the doctor when 
things went wrong. Whilst there was some recognition that changes in the standard of care 
threshold introduced some unpredictability, it was simply the profession ’ s responsibility to 
adapt: ‘ The approach which we have described has long been operated in other jurisdictions, 
where healthcare practice presumably adjusted to its requirements ’ . 94 Needless to say, no 
evidence was presented regarding the experience of adaptation in those other jurisdictions. 
 When the defensive practice fl ag was raised to ward off accepting proof of causation 
on the basis of a  ‘ lost chance ’ of a better outcome after negligent medical treatment in  Gregg 
v Scott , a slightly different approach was evident, suggesting that expanding liability would 
simply not affect clinician behaviour. Lord Nicholls found the defensive practice argument 
 ‘ unimpressive ’ , every doctor was already aware that they may be sued if negligent, and there 
was  ‘ no reason to believe that adopting the approach set out above will affect the practices 
followed by doctors ’ . 95 Again, all of the above was said with no identifi ed evidence on the 
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 98  K  Oliphant ,  ‘ Against Certainty in Tort Law ’ in  Tort Law:  Challenging Orthodoxy ( Hart Publishing ,  2013 )  4 – 5 . 
matter. There is incidentally some irony in the fact that clinical judgement in negligence 
litigation must be  ‘ capable of withstanding logical analysis ’ , 96 that a clear evidence base 
must underpin decision making, whereas legal judgement on issues of defensive practice is 
invariably a product of conjecture without the benefi t of evidence either way. 
 Rebuttal #3: Incompatibility of the  ‘ unproven ’ and  ‘ standard enhancing ’ rebuttals 
 It is worth commenting at this point that these two broad rebuttals of the defensive 
practice argument appear mutually inconsistent  – either the defensive practice argument 
fails because it is lacking empirical substantiation, or it fails because of an unsubstantiated 
judicial assumption that recalibrations in the duty of care threshold enhance standards to 
an extent which outweighs the harms of resulting defensiveness. One rebuttal suggests a 
need for empirical evidence to substantiate these kinds of arguments, whereas the other is 
satisfi ed with judicial hunch. 
 On one view then, both the defensive practice argument and the standard enhancing 
rebuttal are clich é s from competing paradigms,  both of which have been used in ways 
which arguably bypass scrutiny and refl ection. There is, however, a way in which the 
two broad rebuttals can be read together  – if, as Lords Bingham and Browne-Wilkinson 
in the  X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC litigation famously observed, tort ’ s primary loyalty is 
to the principle that  ‘ wrongs should be remedied ’ , 97 then it is surely disproportionate to 
allow arguments about the risks of practising defensively to usurp that remedy completely 
by blocking a duty of care, unless cogent evidence has been presented to validate 
these concerns. The  ‘ wrongs ought to be remedied ’ policy concern, itself a legal clich é , 
communicates a starting position. On this view, a policy preference embedded in tort 
that a claimant generally deserves at least for their case in negligence to be heard, places 
the burden on those raising defensive practice arguments, to convince the court of the 
need to interfere with the usual rules. When a court takes the position that an extension 
of the duty of care will enhance standards, supporting evidence is therefore not required, 
for the court is then acknowledging a duty of care, and not proposing to deviate from the 
 ‘ remedying of wrongs ’ policy. Further, in the context of defensive practice being used as 
a reason to block the path to litigation altogether by pre-empting a duty of care, it may 
seem proportionate to demand some empirical evidence be used to support the argument. 
If we accept this doctrinal reconciliation, then we should presumably accept that for the 
defensive practice claim to have suffi cient potency to modify the usual rules of liability, 
certainly something more than bald assertion or instinct is needed, some form of evidence 
should be required. That is not to say that defensive practice arguments require evidencing 
when raised at the  ‘ duty ’ stage, but not when raised at the  ‘ breach ’ stage. Rather, that there 
is a greater need for scrutiny when defensive practice arguments are wielded at the duty 
stage, given its role as  ‘ pre-emptive control device ’ , 98 often used by the defence to close 
down the case without a full airing of the issues by means of a strike-out application in 
preliminary proceedings. 
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 104  L  Robertson and  K  Broadhurst ,  ‘ Introducing social science evidence in Family Court decision making and 
adjudication: Evidence from England and Wales ’ ( 2019 )  33  Int J of Law, Policy and Family  181 , at 194. 
 In the context of defensive medicine specifi cally, there is a substantial body of 
research claiming to validate the proposition that medical negligence litigation increases 
harmful defensive practices. The second half of this paper refl ects on the forensic value 
of existing research into defensive medicine and whether it might usefully contribute to 
the empirical assessment of defensive practice claims in medical negligence litigation. In 
doing so, the paper draws from studies of defensive practice in medicine conducted in the 
UK to date, and 10 interviews with medical practitioners representing lived experience of 
defensive practice. 
 III. Analysis  –  ‘ Unproven ’ ? Unpacking the  ‘ no evidence ’ claim 
 There is a strong argument that the use of research in judicial decision making is a valuable 
means of increasing the legitimacy of those decisions, for it fosters  ‘ connection ’ between 
the legal sphere and society. 99 But, how would empirical evidence be received by the 
courts, and is it accurate to suggest that there is no empirical evidence of defensive practice 
in medicine 100 and that therefore argumentation based on defensive medicine has no place 
in negligence jurisprudence ? 
 The assertion that empirical evidence is needed in relation to a policy argument 
is certainly an odd claim. Use of empirical data in negligence litigation is rare. Research 
into the use of social science research in judgments has generally concluded that judges 
are often unreceptive to it when raised by lawyers, although that body of research focuses 
on family law applications, 101 and little is known about receptiveness to its use more 
broadly. In practice, empirical research in adversarial negligence litigation tends to be 
used to inform the court on questions relating to  ‘ risk ’ and  ‘ probability ’ when calculating 
an increase of risk for proving causation or where arguments based on loss of a chance 
of a better outcome are interrogated, 102 and not issues of policy in the realms of duty of 
care. The route by which empirical evidence on defensive practice might arrive in the 
courtroom is also not clear  – where it appears, research tends to be mediated through 
expert evidence, but it might be introduced as part and parcel of an advocate ’ s argument, 
or by a judge independently considering material to inform her about the real world. 103 
Use of experts to present this evidence at least means that they are subject to duties to 
 ‘ consider contradictory fi ndings ’ , 104 but it would likely also lead to protracted litigation 
and increased costs. Introduction of empirical evidence by advocates in legal argument 
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raises questions about potential for misuse of research by partisan lawyers, distillation of 
the researchers ’ message for the sake of brevity 105 and whether either judges, or the lawyers 
on the opposing side who should cross-examine that evidence, are in a good position to 
assess the value of that research. 106 Space does not permit a more detailed discussion of the 
mechanisms for such research reaching the courtroom and the checks in place to regulate 
its use. Instead we turn to consider the forensic value of existing research into defensive 
medicine and whether it might usefully inform the substantiation or rebuttal of defensive 
practice argumentation in modern medical negligence cases. 
 The state of research into defensive medical practice 
 Research on defensive practice in medicine began to appear in the United States (US) by 
the early 1970s at the latest. 107 A survey of studies in the UK since then offers an initially 
satisfying consensus of between 50 per cent and 98 per cent 108 of medical practitioners 
reporting themselves as adopting strategies of defensive medicine in their practice. These 
results have been replicated across many jurisdictions, to include; the United States, 109 
Australia, 110 the United Kingdom, 111 Japan, 112 Spain, 113 Italy, 114 Southeast Iran 115 and 
elsewhere. The same convergence is evident across many different specialisms (obstetrics 
and gynaecology, 116 radiotherapy, 117 general practice, 118 surgery, 119 anaesthesiology, 120 
midwifery 121 and psychiatry 122 ). However, important jurisdictional differences mean that 
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these corroborative fi ndings should be treated with caution. For example, US research 
frequently utilises  ‘ correlation ’ studies, claiming to evidence the existence and/or extent 
of defensive practice through the tracking of proxy phenomena. Such proxy phenomena 
include the estimated malpractice claim risk, determined by the adoption of  ‘ claim friendly ’ 
tort reforms in some states, which is then tracked against  ‘ physician supply ’ (the movement 
of doctors from one state to another, thought to signify an aversion to the introduction 
of claim friendly laws affecting particular states), or against  ‘ practice intensity ’ (eg, the 
number of CT scans/MRI scans/hospital admissions). 123 This  ‘ proxy tracking ’ research 
methodology does not translate easily to the UK healthcare system which is broadly 
subject to the same tort regime across the jurisdiction. Transferability is also obscured by 
the fact that reimbursement models in the US mean that doctors are more likely to have 
fi nancial incentives to run more tests. 124 It therefore becomes impossible to separate out 
defensive motives and economic motives for increased diagnostic testing which might 
otherwise be attributed to practising defensively. 
 When we confi ne our attention to UK studies claiming to evidence defensive 
practice in medicine, however, two pertinent facts emerge. First, most studies are authored 
by clinicians or medics working as university academics and not social scientists  – a fact 
which might suggest some unavoidable bias in the conduct of that research. 125 Secondly, 
the study design almost invariably relies on self-reporting of defensiveness by doctors in 
surveys and interviews. Consequently, the claim that these studies do not provide a  reliable 
 ‘ measure ’ of defensive practice or its extent has some appeal. 126 This may be what Jones 
is hinting at when concluding that  ‘ there is very little empirical, as opposed to anecdotal, 
evidence to support the theory that doctors do practise defensively ’ . 127 Depending on the 
stringency of the requirement for  ‘ evidence ’ we might have at least three initial concerns 
regarding the reliability of data generated in this way: fi rst, the variability of headline 
reporting of defensive practice in medicine across UK studies, secondly, self-selection of 
participants resulting in survey bias and thirdly, self-reporting as an unreliable measure 
of behaviour. This is aside from the broader problematic lack of disaggregation in many 
of these studies, discussed further below. 
 Robustness of self-reporting studies 
 (i) Headline variations 
 The variability of headline fi gures of defensive practice in medicine, even within the UK 
context, requires comment. The higher rate of reported defensive practice in medicine in 
Summerton ’ s study in 1995 (98 per cent) 128 may be associated with his cohort of GPs, as 
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compared with the lower reporting of defensive practice in medicine by Ortashi ’ s 2013 
study of hospital doctors (78 per cent) and Bourne et al ’ s  ‘ cross sectional ’ study (70 per cent) 
constituted by approximately one third GPs. 129 Given the position of GPs at the coalface of 
medical practice, advising on what are often vague presentations such as lumps, headaches, 
non-specifi c backpain and bloating without specialist diagnostic equipment to hand, 130 
this is likely to be where some of the highest rates of defensive practice are. However, this 
cohort differentiation does not explain the fi nding of British Medical Association research 
in 2018 that (only) around 50 percent of the doctors surveyed agreed with the statement 
 ‘ I practice defensively because I believe I am working in a blame culture ’ . 131 As the 
headline that 50 per cent of NHS doctors report practising defensively is not specifi cally 
tied into the risk of negligence litigation, but to the far broader context of  ‘ blame culture ’ , 
it might have been predicted that the hit rate would have been even higher than in 
previous studies. This makes the BMA ’ s fi gure of 50 per cent even more surprising, given 
that most research has identifi ed at least 70 per cent of respondent doctors as identifying 
with defensive practice. 132 
 Whatever the reasons for this variability, we could agree that there is a discernible 
consensus that at least half the doctors participating in such research  report themselves as 
using defensive practice. The cumulative impact of this body of research may be enough 
to satisfy a court (if necessary) that defensive practice in medicine is real and is cause for 
concern. However, a court should probably harbour some methodological concerns about 
such studies. 
 (ii) Sample bias and survey framing 
 Most well-known studies of defensive medicine report the possibility of  ‘ selection ’ or 
 ‘ confi rmation ’ bias, in that those volunteering to be surveyed or interviewed are more 
likely to identify with the negatives of liability, hence their agreement to get involved. 
Summerton ’ s work with GPs, for example, reported that 98 per cent of GPs surveyed 
practised defensively, but also recorded that the survey received only a 60 per cent response 
rate and perhaps that this 60 per cent had  ‘ self-selected ’ as the initial communication to 
the participants included the survey questions. 133 Bourne et al reported that most doctors 
surveyed reported practising defensively (over 80 per cent reporting  ‘ hedging ’ and over 
45 per cent reporting avoidance) but also refl ected that their study might have been 
impacted by  ‘ ascertainment bias ’ , presumably as those participating may have had a 
particular subset of experiences/beliefs compared to the target population of doctors as a 
whole. 134 In addition to participant self-selection,  ‘ survey framing ’ can signifi cantly impact 
on reported rates of defensive practice. Baicker et al ’ s 2015 study found that when they 
surveyed doctors in a  ‘ medical malpractice survey ’ and then replicated the same questions 
in a  ‘ cost effective care ’ survey, this produced signifi cantly different levels of reported 
defensive practice. 135 Responses to the former survey were 11.6 per cent more likely 
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to report ordering tests that were not medically necessary than those completing the 
survey on  ‘ cost-effectiveness ’ . Notwithstanding these confessed limitations, 98 per cent 
of Summerton ’ s 60 per cent sample of GPs identifying with defensive practice is still 
statistically persuasive, as is the number of participants in Bourne ’ s study (7, 926). 
 (iii) Self-reporting as anecdote 
 Self-reporting of defensive practice in medicine might be argued to capture a doctor ’ s 
 ‘ perception ’ of defensive practice in medicine, which may not be mirrored in decision 
making on the ground. 136 Even if the doctor ’ s perception of defensiveness does translate 
into practice, the fact that doctors themselves identify defensive practice in medicine in 
their own conduct tells us little about the pervasiveness or signifi cance of that defensiveness 
in their day to day medical judgements. It might therefore be argued that studies relying on 
self-reporting in interviews by doctors are treating anecdote as empirical evidence and,  ‘ the 
plural of anecdote is not data ’ . However, fi rst, most would agree that anecdotes of suffi cient 
quality and quantity  can be heuristically convincing. Secondly, when Jones says that  ‘ there is 
very little empirical, as opposed to anecdotal, evidence to support the theory that doctors 
do practise defensively ’ 137 we can agree without dismissing the whole body of defensive 
practice in medicine research, by noting that most studies do not present their fi ndings as 
objective evidence of defensive practice, but rather as evidence of  perceptions of defensive 
practice. The cumulative anecdotes in this instance do provide convincing evidence, at 
least of practitioner perceptions that defensive practice in medicine is problematic. It is 
worth noting Fanning ’ s argument that doctors frequently over-estimate the risk of being 
sued because of misunderstandings of the law 138  – doctors would therefore perhaps be 
unlikely to change their practices even if liability rules were adjusted in their favour. 
 Quantitative over qualitative research: masking microcosms of defensive practice 
in medicine and the role of the patient 
 The majority of studies appear to be survey based and seek a positive or a negative response 
from doctors, rather than qualitative answers. 139 Coding by the researcher of 10 interviews 
with doctors revealed a prominent narrative which is masked by quantitative studies  – the 
negotiation of defensiveness in particular doctor: patient relationships. 
 Defensive behaviour can in part be viewed as a by-product of a more hostile 
patient: doctor relationship. In the face of demanding patients, the doctor can feel like 
the vulnerable party, 140 with some patients acting as  ‘ predators ’ and defensive doctors as 
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 142  Interviewee #6. 
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 144  Interviewee #7. 
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 ‘ adapted prey ’ . 141 From this vulnerable position, defensive strategies might be used to 
avoid (spurious) complaints. A number of interviewees suggested that they  ‘ profi led ’ new 
patients,  ‘ diagnosing ’ whether the patient in front of them had a predilection to complain 
and defensive behaviour was sometimes used as a negotiation strategy in diffi cult doctor: 
patient relationships. This introduced a patient-specifi c dynamic, independent of clinical 
observations, into medical decision making based on the doctors ’ assessment of propensity 
to threaten complaint or legal action. These patients presented as either (1) aggressive or 
(2) particularly anxious and resistant to reassurance. Both might be sent for additional 
(defensive) scans. The aggressive patient (or patient ’ s family) was observed as: 
 ‘ quite open, especially the horrible, manipulative characters: well, if you ’ re 
wrong I ’ m gonna sue you, I ’ m gonna do this, I ’ m gonna do that  … and it 
actually feels very uncomfortable when they say that, because if you want to 
fi nd a solicitor to take a case on, you can tell  ‘ em a pack of lies or half-truths 
and get them to take on the case and potentially cause a lot of trouble. ’ 142 
 Some aggressive patients or relatives were well known in one GP ’ s practice: 
 ‘ on the times that I have treated that patient my documentation has been anal 
(laughs). And if there ’ s been any doubt about whether treatment is needed, say 
something like an antibiotic, in that person ’ s case they would get it  … whereas 
with someone who isn ’ t known to be like that, you would have a reasoned 
conversation with them and say well, I don ’ t think you maybe need antibiotics at 
this stage  … you can ’ t have that conversation with them, erm, so we just treat, cos 
its safest in terms of your  … your safety, maybe not so much for the patient. ’ 143 
 The really anxious patient might also be referred for further tests earlier than others with 
the same symptoms  ‘ not only for their peace of mind but because in the event of an 
adverse outcome  … in your head you ’ re thinking, would they be likely to pursue me if 
I was wrong ? ’ 144 If the doctor ’ s clinical judgement was wrong, 
 ‘ The patient who was maybe very, very anxious would be very keen to say,  “ I 
told you so ” and create erm, some trouble. And the trouble doesn ’ t necessarily 
fi t with the severity of the mistake that you make either  … you could make 
the same, have the same outcome and the same mistake but [be the subject of 
complaint] just because of the different character of the patient. ’ 145 
 Another GP associated patient anxiety with the likelihood of complaint and defensive 
testing:  ‘ A lady got health anxiety and has been investigated to the  ‘ nth ’ degree because she 
has complained and, you have to think, well this isn ’ t good for her. ’ 146 
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 Gauging patients for their propensity to complain was a common theme in 
interviews (lawyers as patients were to be treated especially cautiously! 147 ). Knowledge 
that a patient had a history of medical error prior to the current consultation might affect 
this assessment, but in some cases it was informed by patients blatantly threatening some 
form of complaint if they did not get what they wanted: 
 ‘ I ’ ve got one at the moment, he wants me to give him diazepam and I ’ m not 
going to because it ’ s not good for him and he ’ s threatening to complain, but 
sometimes you know you ’ re right so you can overrule them. ’ 148 
 Another doctor admitted to picking up clues from her dialogue with patients: 
 ‘ if they ’ ve already mentioned things like  ‘ complications ’ , if they ’ ve had an 
experience in the past where a family member has had a bad experience in 
health care, you can sometimes tell the patients who are going to be potentially 
litigious. And that will come into your decision-making process. ’ 149 
 All of this has implications for the health of the doctor – patient relationship: 
 ‘ most of my patients I have a good relationship with them and I enjoy the 
relationship I have with them, but it ’ s got the potential to put up barriers, 
because you see them a bit as people who have the possibility of hurting you 
really. ’ 150 
 Trust from patients was viewed by one GP who had done a lot of locum work, as part of 
the solution to patients applying pressure for certain tests: 
 ‘ So you build up a bank of trust if you like, so if you do make a mistake, you ’ ve 
got a relationship with the patient and the relatives and its able to get explained 
and hopefully not escalate. I think as a locum you ’ re at high risk of complaints 
escalating because you don ’ t have that previous goodwill in the bank from 
patients. ’ 151 
 Other authors have documented the use of defensive strategies as a means of managing the 
demands of patients and building trust and confi dence in the doctor: patient relationship. 
As Fritz and Holten acknowledge, defensive practices are not only used as a substitute for 
trust, they are used by practitioners to build trust for future encounters, but can backfi re 
in the long term. Defensive practices used in this way (such as referral for unnecessary 
scanning), create expectations which are then disappointed if not replicated in later 
appointments, and so a  ‘ snowball effect ’ can occur. 152 The relationship between patient 
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propensity to seek reassurance from tests and trust in the doctor was highlighted by 
another interviewee. This practitioner spoke of defensive medical practice as prompted by 
particular patients who, for example, feigned pain on one side, 153 but were showing no 
signs of distress and using 
 ‘ buzz words to get a scan or investigation  … not trusting us as clinicians 
and so therefore it then reinforces that they can just come in and get those 
investigations and there ’ s no repercussions for them, because the wonderful 
NHS just foots the bill. ’ 154 
 The added value of recognising defensiveness as, in part, a response to particular patient 
behaviours, has implications for policy makers, raising questions about how doctors might 
be better supported so that they feel less vulnerable to these pressures, how patients might 
be better informed so that they are less inclined to apply these pressures and how trust 
can be strengthened in therapeutic encounters which are increasingly with locum staff. 
Recognising these facets of defensive medicine should not detract from the responsibility 
of the legal framework. The law is complicit in this process. Where culpability might be 
levied partially at the patient in negligence claims, that responsibility is seemingly erased 
due to the law ’ s refusal to entertain fi ndings of contributory negligence. 155 Arguably it is 
the law, and increased emphasis on  ‘ outing medical error ’ which empowers the patient to 
make such threats. 156 
 Non-disaggregation of intensity of defensive practice in medicine, triggers for defensive 
practice in medicine and benefi cial effects 
 If lawyers utilising defensive practice argumentation in the course of medical negligence 
litigation were called upon to substantiate their claim with empirical evidence, not only 
could they potentially be confronted by the methodological concerns expressed above, 
but they might also fi nd that the available research does not map onto the narrow judicial 
concern with harmful defensive practices triggered by negligence litigation. This is because 
the research agenda has tended not to disaggregate the intensity of defensiveness, the causal 
factors behind defensiveness or the positive impact as distinct from the negative impact of 
complaint pressures. 
 Disaggregation problems 
 (i) Intensity of defensive practice 
 The headline fi gures of reported defensive practice in medicine ( ‘ x per cent of doctors 
surveyed reported they sometimes practised defensively ’ ), are not readily disaggregated 
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into the types of defensive conduct or its triggers. Consequently this research frequently 
tells us little about the gravity or frequency of defensive practice in medicine; for example, 
whether it affects their participants ’ decision making every day for every patient, once a 
week, or once every few months ? Is its extent merely to spend a few extra minutes after 
appointments typing up patient notes which may be regarded as clinically unnecessary ? 
Or is it to frequently or routinely recommend invasive procedures which are not medically 
indicated ? There is some attempt to disaggregate types of reported defensiveness, for 
example, in Ortashi ’ s study of hospital doctors (27 per cent said they ‘ performed unnecessary 
interventions ’ because of the fear of litigation) and Bourne ’ s study (23 per cent reported 
 ‘ suggesting invasive procedures ’ against their professional judgement), but in both instances, 
this  ‘ twenty something ’ per cent is a long way from the headline fi gures from the same 
research of 78 per cent and 70 per cent of participant doctors reporting defensive practice 
in medicine respectively. Bourne et al ’ s study published in 2015 is more robust in this 
regard, being both quantitative and qualitative. 157 Bourne ’ s team investigated the impact of 
complaints on doctors ’ psychological health and on their medical practice in the UK. Even 
so, the authors ’ comment that their response rate was relatively low (11.4 per cent) and that 
this in itself may indicate their sample was unrepresentative and that the cross-sectional 
nature of the study (of the 7,926 respondents, approximately one third were consultants, 
one third in general practice and one third were junior doctors) meant that causal factors 
could not be elucidated. Further, some of the results of Bourne ’ s study are perplexing, 
for example, the fi nding that very similar scores are given for reported defensive practice 
by doctors with a  ‘ current or recent complaint ’ and those with  ‘ no recent experience of 
complaints. ’ 158 This gives some credence to the self-selection problem as it suggests that 
doctors who are inclined to practise defensively are over-represented in this study  – why 
else would the variable of experiencing a recent complaint make so little difference ? 
 (ii) Triggers of defensiveness 
 Most research in this area studies the impact of  ‘ complaint ’ rather than litigation in 
particular and this poses a major problem for existing research ever being useful in the 
context of supporting a claim in court that the duty of care should not be extended. 
As indicated, Lord Scarman ’ s account of defensive practice which identifi ed tort as the 
main trigger for detrimental defensiveness in medicine, likely needs adjusting in light of a 
proactive regulator (the General Medical Council (GMC)) 159 and a regulatory landscape 
characterised by layers of organisational activity, multiple actors and complexity. 160 The 
regulatory mix of causes of defensive practice in medicine therefore varies. For some 
interviewees, it was not the negligence action which was likely to be the main source of 
patient harming defensiveness, but rather fear of problems with the regulator because of 
the greater personal impact: 
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 ‘ Whereas the GMC, irrespective of the outcome the process is unpleasant  … and 
stressful  … it ’ s only a matter of time because it comes to us all at one point, but 
I would rather be sued than be investigated by the GMC, given the choice. ’ 161 
 ‘ the GMC, it cuts into who you are as a professional, you know, it could be 
your whole livelihood, it could be your whole life and who you are as a doctor. 
So as well as the fi nancial aspect its, erm, it really takes the rug out from under 
your feet. ’ 162 
 … and because of concerns that the regulator would not be fair in its assessment: 
 ‘ they very much take a guilty until proven innocent approach, they ’ re 
extraordinarily heavy handed ’ . 163 
 There was also a perception of a ramping up of GMC action against doctors: 
 ‘ The GMC  … I get the impression, are doing a lot more fi tness to practise stuff. 
Erm and there ’ s lots of reasons for that as well. I think appraisal and revalidation 
has allowed for more scrutiny of doctors and that ’ s not a bad thing, that ’ s a 
good thing. Erm, what is acceptable professionally has changed  … massively. So 
therefore they have to do more. ’ 164 
 Others regarded the risk of public shaming as a key factor in motivating defensiveness, and 
although publicity might be generated by a negligence claim, some interviewees regarded 
that as a lesser concern than the publicity associated with GMC action which would result 
in published fi ndings on the register of medical practitioners: 165 
 ‘ the GMC  … huge impact. Massive impact. Erm. One, it ’ s public so it ’ s put 
on the internet isn ’ t it ?  … Erm two, the processes I believe are lengthy and 
arduous and not easily understood. And they take quite a long time so its 
hanging over you for quite a long time. ’ 166 
 For another it was the sheer multitude of avenues for complaint that was a key concern: 
 ‘ you ’ re in triple or quadruple jeopardy for the places where they can pursue you. 
There ’ s the local complaints policy, there ’ s the kind of Clinical Commissioning 
Group complaints policy, right the way up to the ombudsman, but if they 
decide to go off on a tangent to the GMC, they can do that. If they decide to 
go through civil litigation they can. ’ 167 
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 Yet, for other interviewees, GMC action was perceived as a lesser threat than litigation  – 
it was  ‘ distant ’ ,  ‘ it ’ s more to do with behaviour, like taking drugs or having an affair with 
a patient or doing something fraudulent ’ ,  ‘ you have to do something really pretty bad, 
kind of Shipman-esque for a GMC investigation ’ 168 and far less likely to fi gure in their 
thinking than litigation:  ‘ I don ’ t think most people would expect to go through that in 
their careers. ’ 169 Some were not aware of fi tness to practise cases  ‘ except tabloid reports 
of that paediatrician who took photos of children ’ s bodies ’ , 170 whereas for  ‘ obs and gynae 
work ’ , civil actions were  ‘ guaranteed ’ and just  ‘ bad luck ’ . 171 Any belief that the GMC 
would not be interested in allegations of substandard care as opposed to criminal conduct 
or breaching boundaries with a patient is clearly misplaced, 172 and suggests that doctors ’ 
own perceptions about complaints processes may be based on misunderstandings. 
 Some interviewees spoke of being unable to separate medico-legal defensiveness 
from defensive practice as an inherent part of their clinical judgement, a kind of epistemic 
or learned defensiveness. Referring patients for scans or other tests when not clearly 
clinically indicated might be bound up with medico-legal concerns, but it was recognised 
as having the potential to identify something unexpected which would otherwise have 
been missed. This was therefore an expression of epistemic humility on the interviewees ’ 
part. Similarly, one GP spoke about her  ‘ “ three strikes and you ’ re out ” rule ’ as an example 
of defensive medicine. This tactic/strategy had been learned from a senior partner and 
determined that if a patient presented with a seemingly innocuous problem three times 
without a defi nitive understanding of the problem being reached, hospital admission for 
further scans should be considered because of  ‘ the concern that you might be seen to 
have been seeing a patient repeatedly and not taken them seriously. ’ 173 However, this was 
later explained as good practice  – if three consultations had not yielded an explanation, 
perhaps there was something  ‘ not right ’ . Again, defensiveness was wrapped up in the 
inherent, undiminishing, 174 uncertainty of medicine, 175 and awareness of its limitations, 
albeit galvanised by medico-legal concerns. Medico-legal concerns rarely had a discrete 
and identifi able impact on their judgement; it was merely part of a very complex process 
of assessing risks or  ‘ sophisticated gambling ’ . 176 
 These accounts of defensive behaviour confi rm that defensiveness in medicine 
exists independently of the threat of being sued  – defensive behaviours are associated 
with multiple avenues of complaint and are inherent in the practice of modern medicine, 
evidenced perhaps by the fact that even  ‘ no fault ’ systems of liability still feature defensive 
medicine. 177 Further, there are many shades of medico-legal defensiveness, and at the 
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edges of decision making, defensive practice concerns could nudge doctors towards options 
which  were not inconsistent with their clinical judgement. But this brings us no closer to 
identifying whether this defensiveness is bad for patients  – on one view, medico-legal fears 
have galvanised a precautionary approach to risk and concerted efforts to reassure which 
arguably benefi ts the patient. On the other, framing defensive behaviours as  ‘ treating the 
patient ’ s anxiety ’ might be construed as a  ‘ social defence ’ , 178 used by interviewees to justify 
conduct retrospectively to others and themselves. What it does demonstrate, however, 
is that practitioners struggled to be sure how much of a role medico-legal concerns 
specifi cally played in their decision making, which again raises questions about the weight 
and signifi cance courts would and should place on defensive practice in medicine studies 
which are based on self-reporting models. 
 (iii) Accounting for the benefi ts of practising defensively 
 In line with the optimism of the standard enhancing narratives found in  Phelps ,  Michael 
and  Montgomery , much defensive practice in medicine research envisages that practising 
defensively can be positive in its effects and can be read as validating suggestions that 
the threat of tort liability  can generate improved standards of care. 179 Defensive practice 
in medicine is widely acknowledged in the literature as not inherently bad and could 
be consistent with  ‘ quality improvements ’ such as increases in screening, note taking, 
eliciting of patient feedback. For example, Summerton ’ s study of GPs used a defi nition of 
defensiveness which encompassed both benefi cial and detrimental defensiveness. 180 His 
fi ndings that 98 per cent of respondents to his survey reported changing practice due 
to the possibility of patient complaint therefore told us little about how much of this 
changing practice we should be concerned about. 
 It is notable that a number of the author ’ s interviewees also did not regard defensiveness 
as necessarily undesirable, rather it was  ‘ erring on the side of caution ’ , 181  ‘ an extra level 
of carefulness in your documentation and management plans ’ 182 and  ‘ potentially, well, 
it ’ s a good thing isn ’ t it ? ’ 183 All of these statements would seem to be corroborative of 
the idea that awareness of the risk of being sued, or otherwise the subject of complaints, 
sharpens medical practice and is entirely consistent with the legal standard of care which 
emphasises precautionary intervention to address even small risks of catastrophic harm. 184 
But separating out the costs and benefi ts of defensive medical action was acknowledged 
as far from easy. This was apparent when another practitioner referred to low risk 
interventions, used with patients experiencing pain for whom nothing else had worked, 
as an example of defensive medicine. These interventions might involve an injection, but 
there was sometimes no real evidence that it would help the patient. In some cases, these 
procedures were administered anyway, at least in part, to be seen to be doing something 
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and not neglecting or  ‘ fobbing off  ’ the patient. These procedures were not however purely 
 ‘ defensive ’ as they might have a therapeutic  ‘ placebo ’ effect for the patient. 185 In cases like 
this, defensiveness could be part and parcel of the therapeutic package for anxious patients 
or patients without a diagnosis or clear way forward. Defensiveness  ‘ treated ’ the patient ’ s 
heightened anxiety. By eliminating certain diagnoses, the patient ’ s anxiety was addressed 
and that was all part of addressing the patient ’ s broader wellbeing. In the words of one 
doctor: 
 ‘ is that genuine defensive practise or is that actually us just trying to help the 
patient in any way that we possibly can ?  … That ’ s a very diffi cult line to draw. 
Are we stopping them complaining or actually is all of medicine stopping 
patients complaining ? ’ 186 
 As is highlighted by these doctors ’ accounts, without detailed research, often we cannot 
know whether the defensive action in a given instance was consistent with optimal or 
suboptimal levels of care until we know what its outcome is for this patient and the 
patient population as a whole. Clearly the same defensive behaviour may prove to be 
positive for that particular patient (reducing anxiety by eliminating a serious but unlikely 
diagnosis), but negative in reducing the opportunity cost for other patients. Defensive 
practice research rarely distinguishes negative outcomes for that patient (eg unnecessary 
side effects, anxiety) and negative outcomes for the remainder of the population, such as 
that increasing follow up appointments to protect yourself meant that would be  ‘ one less 
appointment for another person with another problem ’ . 187 
 The above responses illuminate the disconnect between forensic accounts of 
defensive practice in medicine and the shape of defensive practice research. The clich é d 
judicial account of defensive practice in medicine in court judgments is concerned with 
detrimental defensiveness as  caused by negligence litigation. Research may have affi rmed 
the phenomenon of defensive medicine generally and its potentially harmful effects, 
but we remain in a state of ignorance as to the precise net outcomes of extensions in 
negligence liability for individual patients and the broader population. UK research has 
been characterised by clinicians studying other clinicians using a  ‘ self-reporting ’ model. 
This approach has produced valuable insights, but also features a number of confounding 
variables which have not advanced our understanding of the extent to which increased 
liability in negligence specifi cally triggers harmful defensive medicine. As indicated above, 
there is a qualitative difference, however, between an argument that the risk of defensive 
practice justifi es precluding a duty of care altogether, and saying that it is a factor which 
ought to be weighed in the balance when deciding whether the duty of care has been 
breached. In cases of the former it is arguably right that the courts should insist upon 
more robust evidence that extending negligence liability risks causing more harm than 
good, and it is not clear that the existing body of research offers that degree of certainty. 
The available evidence could, however, usefully inform instinctual judgements about 
where the standard of care should be fi xed in diffi cult cases and provide a reminder to 
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abstain from fi nding negligence too readily. The result of the  ‘ crowd effect ’ made up by 
the multitude of factors which combine to incentivise practising defensively in medicine 
should not absolve the courts from responsibility for their part in it. 
 Conclusions 
 The language of  ‘ defensive practice ’ emerged from concerns about the impact of medical 
negligence liability on therapeutic endeavours. This basic premise was re-contextualised 
in tort jurisprudence into a broader cautionary argument against extending the liabilities 
of other professions and public bodies, predominantly played out in connection with 
questions of duty of care. These re-contextualised defensive practice arguments have lost 
their potency and magical infl uence, with judges consistently rebutting arguments of 
defensive practice on the grounds either of a lack of empirical evidence, or based on 
 ‘ instinctual judgement ’ that increasing the scope of liability will be standard enhancing. 
 In the context of defensive medicine specifi cally, it seems that existing research 
into defensive medicine, if used to answer the call for empirical evidence, may not 
survive judicial scrutiny. This is because of heavy reliance on self-reporting methods of 
investigation and  ‘ disaggregation problems ’ , namely the diffi culties of separating out types 
and forms of defensiveness and attributing or isolating the causes of defensive medical 
behaviour through research. The interviews conducted for this paper provide recurring 
indications of just why it is so diffi cult for research to evidence and quantify defensive 
practices. Examples of defensive medicine from just 10 doctors were protean and often 
inherently unmeasurable, so that it appeared impossible to untangle the relative impact of 
triggers to practise defensively, but also to say whether the benefi ts of defensive behaviour 
outweighed the costs to patients. The narratives presented here from just 10 interviews 
are, of course, not to be treated in themselves as  ‘ evidence ’ , but rather as indications 
that defensive practice in medicine is far more complex and nuanced than many of 
the narratives around defensive practice in medicine presently acknowledge. Current 
research has tended to mask issues which deserve further investigation, in particular, how 
defensiveness might cause the  ‘ profi ling ’ of patients for their propensity to complain, 
sometimes tainting the therapeutic relationship from the fi rst meeting. These issues may be 
important considerations for policy making, not least because they indicate the insidious 
nature of medico-legal defensiveness, its weaponisation in particular types of encounter 
and its potential to damage doctor – patient relationships. It also suggests a need for patients 
to be better informed and encouraged to play their part in reducing harmful defensiveness. 
 Fundamentally, research has done little to disaggregate the types of defensive conduct 
or its causes and therefore does not unequivocally advance the claim that increasing 
negligence liabilities produces harmful defensive practices. This fi nding may be regarded as 
offering credence to those who point to the lack of concrete ‘ evidence ’ of defensive practice, 
leading some commentators to reference defensive practices as  ‘ spectral ’ , a  ‘ bogeyman ’ , 188 
and a  ‘ red herring ’ . 189 The author agrees that it is undoubtedly disappointing that 
despite 50 years of research into defensive medicine, we cannot confi dently assert that 
 188  Implying that evidence for its existence (in New Zealand) was thin:  R  Paterson ,  ‘ The bogeyman of defensive 
medicine ’ ( 2006 )  September ,  NZ Doctor  14 . 
 189  G  Ridic ,  ‘ Medical Malpractice in Connecticut: Defensive Medicine, Real Problem or a Red Herring  – Example 
of Assessment of Quality Outcomes Variables ’ ( 2012 )  20 ( 1 )  Acta Inform Med  39 . 
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this research has generated the empirical evidence which could unequivocally validate 
defensive practice arguments in the courtroom. However, it is not the norm to validate 
policy arguments in negligence litigation with incontrovertible empirical evidence. The 
fi ndings of this paper do suggest that any courts engaged in such scrutiny should be made 
aware of the diffi culties of establishing linear relationships between negligence liability 
and harmful defensive practice. The dangers that must be avoided are that the courts 
discount altogether concerns about defensive medicine because it is no longer possible to 
disaggregate the role that negligence liability plays, and disregard the signs that it clearly 
does operate as a cumulative, contributory cause, even if not a  ‘ but for ’ cause. 190 
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